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Abstract 
 
The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious apples-to-oranges 
problems: (i) There is no unified theoretical framework to analyze the macroeconomic 
consequences of controls; (ii) there is significant heterogeneity across countries and time in 
the control measures implemented; (iii) there are multiple definitions of what constitutes a 
“success”  and (iv) the empirical studies lack a common methodology—furthermore these 
are significantly “overweighted” by a couple of country cases (Chile and Malaysia).  
In this paper, we attempt to address some of these shortcomings by: being very explicit 
about what measures are construed as capital controls. Also, given that success is measured 
so differently across studies, we sought to “standardize” the results of over 30 empirical 
studies we summarize in this paper.  The standardization was done by constructing two 
indices of capital controls: Capital Controls Effectiveness Index (CCE Index), and 
Weighted Capital Control Effectiveness Index (WCCE Index). The difference between 
them lies only in that the WCCE controls for the differentiated degree of methodological 
rigor applied to draw conclusions in each of the considered papers. Inasmuch as possible, 
we bring to bear the experiences of less well known episodes than those of Chile and 
Malaysia.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
    The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious issues that make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to compare across theoretical and empirical studies.  We dub 
these the apples-to-oranges problems and they include: (i) There is no unified theoretical 
framework (say, as in the currency crisis literature) to analyze the macroeconomic 
consequences of controls; (ii) there is significant heterogeneity across countries and time in 
the capital control measures implemented; (iii) there are multiple definitions of what 
constitutes a “success” (capital controls are a single policy instrument—but there  are many 
policy objectives); and (iv) the empirical studies lack a common methodology and are 
furthermore significantly “overweighted” by the two poster children--Chile and Malaysia.  
 Our goal in this paper is to find a common ground among the non-comparabilities in 
the existing literature.  Of course, there is usually a level of generality that is sufficiently 
encompassing.  After all, an apples-to-oranges problem can be solved by calling everything 
fruit.  Our goal is, as far as possible, to measures of capital controls on a uniform basis.  
Once done, it should be easier to understand the cross-country and time-series experience. 
We attempt to address some of these apples-to-oranges shortcomings by being very 
explicit about what measures are construed as capital controls.  We not only document the 
more drastic differences across countries/episodes and between controls on inflows and 
outflows, but the more subtle differences in types of inflow or outflow controls. Also, given 
that success is measured so differently across studies, we standardize (wherever possible) 
the results of over 30 empirical studies summarized in this paper. Inasmuch as possible, we 
bring to bear the experiences of episodes less well known than those of Chile and Malaysia.  
The standardization was done by constructing two indices of capital controls: 
Indices of Capital Controls Effectiveness (CCE), and Weighted Capital Control 
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Effectiveness (WCCE ). The difference between them lies only in that the WCCE controls 
for the differentiated degree of methodological rigor applied to draw conclusions in each of 
the considered papers.  
With these indexes, our results can be summarized briefly. Capital controls on 
inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition of capital 
flows, and reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence there is more 
controversial). Capital controls on inflows seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and 
hence, the current account balance). As to controls on outflows, there is Malaysia and there 
is everybody else. In Malaysia, controls reduced outflows, and may have given room for 
more independent monetary policy (the other poster child does not fare as well, in that our 
results are not as conclusive as for the Chilean controls on inflows).  Absent the Malaysian 
experience, there is little systematic evidence of “success” in imposing controls, however, 
defined. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section summarizes some of the key 
reasons why capital controls—particularly capital controls on inflows—are either 
considered or implemented.  Controls, as we note help deal with what we dub as the “four 
fears”. Section III focuses on the distinctions among types of capital controls—highlighting 
that not all capital control measures are created equal and therefore can be simply lumped 
together in a rough capital controls index.  Section IV, examines the existing empirical 
evidence by standardizing and sorting studies along a variety of criteria.  Namely, we focus 
on the following sorting strategy.  First, we analyze separately cases where the study was 
multi country or focused on a single case study; second, we distinguish the cases where the 
controls were primarily designed to deal with inflows or outflows; third, we provide an ad 
hoc (but uniform) criteria to rank the approach or econometric rigor applied in the study to 
 4
test hypotheses about the effects of the controls; and last, we evaluate the outcomes 
reported in the studies according to the definition of what constitutes a success.  The last 
section discusses some of the policy implications of our findings. 
 
II. THE RATIONALE FOR CAPITAL CONTROLS AND THE “FOUR FEARS” 
 
Anyone examining the literature on capital controls, which spans many decades and 
all the regions around the globe, would be well advised to retain a sense of irony.  
Repeatedly, policy makers have sought refuge in tax laws, supervisory restraint, and 
regulation of financial transactions to cope with external forces that they deem to be 
unacceptable.  Often they rationalized their actions on loftier grounds, sometimes so 
effectively as to make it difficult to clearly identify episodes of controls on capital. 
But in all these episodes, four fears lurk beneath the surface. 
 
1. Fear of appreciation   
Being the darling of investors in global financial centers has the decided, albeit often 
temporary, advantage of having ample access to funds at favorable cost.  With the capital 
inflow comes upward pressure on the exchange value of the currency, rendering domestic 
manufacturers less competitive in global markets, and especially so relative to their close 
competitors who are not so favored as an investment vehicle.  A desire to stem such an 
appreciation (which Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, refer to as “fear of floating”) is typically 
manifest in the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Over time, though, sterilizing 
such reserve accumulation (the topic of Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998) becomes more 
difficult, and more direct intervention more appealing. 
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2. Fear of “hot money” 
  For policy makers in developing countries, becoming the object of foreign investors’ 
attention is particularly troubling if such affection is viewed as fleeting.  The sudden 
injection of funds into a small market can cause an initial dislocation that is mirrored by the 
strains associated with their sudden withdrawal.  Such a distrust of “hot money” was behind 
James Tobin’s initial proposal to throw sand in the wheels of international finance, an idea 
that has been well received in at least some quarters.  Simply put, a high-enough tax (if 
effectively enforced) would dissuade the initial inflow and pre-empt the pain associated 
with the inevitable outflow. 
 
3. Fear of large inflows 
 Policy makers in emerging market economies do not universally distrust the providers 
of foreign capital.  Not all money is hot but even then, sometimes the sheer volume of 
flows matters.  A large volume of capital inflows, particularly when it is sometimes 
indiscriminate in the search for higher yields (in the manner documented by Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart, 1994), causes dislocations in the financial system.  Foreing funds 
can fuel asset price bubbles and encourage excess risk taking by cash-rich domestic 
intermediaries.  Again recourse to tax may seem to yield a large benefit. 
 
4. Fear of loss of monetary autonomy 
 The interests of global investors and domestic policy makers need not always—or even 
often—align.  But a trinity is always at work that it is not possible to have a fixed (or highly 
managed) exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy, and open capital markets (as 
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discussed in Frankel, 2001).  If there is some attraction to retaining some element of 
monetary policy flexibility, something has to give up.  However, in the presence of the 
aforementioned fear of floating, giving up capital mobility may seem more attractive than 
surrendering monetary policy autonomy. 
Whatever the reason inducing action, some form of capital control might seem as 
controlling exchange rate pressures, stemming large inflows, and regaining an element of 
monetary autonomy.  Less fortunate are those policy makers who impose controls to reduce 
capital flight, because investors seeking safety—most importantly including domestic 
residents as well as foreigners—are seldom dissuaded by regulatory restraint. 
 
III. CAPITAL CONTROLS? WHAT DO WE MEAN BY CAPITAL CONTROLS? 
In most of the empirical literature there are no distinctions between controls on 
outflows and inflows—these exercises suffer from the same problems as the de jure IMF 
classification of exchange rate arrangements.  Even when a distinction is made between 
inflows and outflows (as we do here), controls can and do range from the explicit to the 
subtle and the market friendly to the coercive.  1 
Furthermore, when considering the impacts and effectiveness of capital controls one 
cannot lump together the experiences of countries that have not substantially liberalized 
(i.e., India and China) with countries that actually went down the path of financial and 
capital account liberalization and decide at some point to reintroduce controls, as the latter 
                                                          
1  There is, of course, the important issue of temporary versus permanent policies 
which is  a distinction not addressed here owing to the fact that most empirical studies do 
not focus on this issue.  For a model and a discussion of the temporary versus permanent 
issue see Reinhart and Smith (2002). 
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have developed institutions and practices that are integrated in varying degrees to 
international capital markets. 
 Tables 1-2, which squarely focus on measures targeted to affect inflows in countries 
which had already gone the route of capital account liberalization 2 indeed highlight the 
heterogeneity in both subtlety and “market-friendliness” of capital control measures that 
have been tried in Asia, Europe, and Latin America during booms (these involve controls 
on capital inflows) as well as crashes (and attempts to curb capital outflows).  These 
measures not only differ in subtlety and other features but also in intensity. 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2  Hence, these cases involve the reintroduction of controls. 
3  For a measure that “quantifies” the intensity of these measures see Montiel and Reinhart  
(1999). 
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Table1.  Restrictions on Inflows and “Prudential Requirements:” Asia 
 
Country and date (in parentheses) denoting the first year of the surge in inflows 
 
Indonesia (1990) 
March, 1991:  Central Bank adopts measures to discourage offshore borrowing.  Bank Indonesia begins to 
scale down its swap operations by reducing individual banks' limits from 25 to 20 percent of capital.  The 
three-month swap premium was raised by 5 percentage points. 
October, 1991:  All state-related offshore commercial borrowing was made subject to prior approval by the 
Government and annual ceilings were set for new commitments over the next five years. 
November, 1991: Further measures are taken to discourage offshore borrowing. The limits on banks' net open 
market foreign exchange positions were tightened by placing a separate limit on off-balance sheet positions.   
Bank Indonesia also announced that future swap operations (except for "investment swaps" with maturities of 
more than two years) would be undertaken only at the initiative of Bank Indonesia. 
 
Malaysia (1989) 
June 1, 1992:  Limits on non-trade-related swap transactions were imposed on commercial banks. 
January 17, 1994-August 1994:  Banks were subject to a ceiling on their non-trade- or noninvestment-related 
external liabilities. 
January 24, 1994-August 1994:  Residents were prohibited from selling short-term monetary instruments to 
nonresidents. 
February 2, 1994-August 1994:  Commercial banks were required to place with Bank Negara the ringgit 
funds of foreign banking institutions (Vostro accounts) held in non-interest bearing accounts.  However, in the 
January-May period these accounts were considered part of the eligible liabilities base for the calculation of 
required reserves, resulting in a negative effective interest rate in Vostro balances. 
February 23, 1994-August 1994:  Commercial banks are not allowed to undertake non-trade related swap 
and outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers. 
 
Philippines (1992) 
July, 1994:  Bangko Central begins to discourage forward cover arrangements with non-resident financial 
institutions.  
 
Thailand (1988) 
Banks and finance companies net foreign exchange positions may not exceed 20 percent of capital. 
Banks and finance companies net foreign liabilities may not exceed 20 percent of capital. 
Residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency deposits except only for trade-related purposes. 
April, 1990:  Banks and finance companies net foreign exchange positions limit raised to 25 percent of 
capital. 
August 8, 1995:  Reserve requirements, to be held in the form of non-interest bearing deposits at the Bank of 
Thailand, on short-term non-resident baht accounts were raised from 2 percent to 7 percent.  While reserve 
requirements on domestic deposits are also 7 percent, up to 5 percent can be held in the form of interest-
bearing public bonds. 
December 1995: The 7 percent reserve requirement is extended to finance companies short-term (less than 
one year) promissory notes held by non-residents. 
A variety of measures aimed at reducing foreign-financed lending were introduced. 
April 19, 1996:  Offshore borrowing with maturities of less than 1 year by commercial banks, BIBF offices, 
finance companies and finance and security companies will be subject to a 7-percent minimum reserve 
requirement in the form of a nonremunerated deposit with the Bank of Thailand.  Loans for trade purposes 
will be exempt. 
Sources:  Alfiler (1994), Bank Indonesia, Annual Report, various issues, Bank Negara, Annual Report, 
various issues, and Bank of Thailand reports, various issues.   
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Table1. (continued)  Restrictions on Inflows and Prudential Requirements: Eastern Europe 
and Latin America 
 
 
Country and date (in parentheses) denoting the first year of the surge in inflows 
 
 
Brazil (1992) 
October, 1994:   A 1 percent tax on foreign investment in the stock market.  Eliminated on March 10, 1995. 
The tax on Brazilian companies issuing bonds overseas was raised from 3 percent to 7 percent of the total.  
Eliminated on March 10, 1995. 
The tax paid by foreigners on fixed interest investments in Brazil was raised from 5 percent to 9 percent.  
Reduced back to 5 percent on March 10, 1995. 
The Central Bank raised limits on the amount of dollars that can be bought on foreign exchange markets. 
 
Chile (1990) 
June, 1991:  Nonrenumerated 20 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank for a period 
of one year on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.   
The stamp tax of 1.2 percent a year (previously paid by domestic currency credits only) was applied to foreign 
loans as well.  This requirement applies to all credits during their first year, with the exception of trade loans. 
May, 1992: The reserve requirement on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms is raised 
to 30 percent.  Hence, all foreign currency liabilities have a common reserve requirement. 
 
Colombia (1991) 
June, 1991:  A 3 percent withholding tax on foreign exchange receipts from personal services rendered 
abroad and other transfers, which could be claimed as credit against income tax liability. 
February, 1992:  Banco de la Republica increases its commission on its cash purchases of foreign exchange 
from 1.5 percent to 5 percent. 
June, 1992: Regulation of the entry of foreign currency as payment for services. 
September, 1993: A nonrenumerated 47 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank on 
liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  The reserve requirement is to be maintained for 
the duration of the loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of 18 months or less, except for trade credit.   
August, 1994: Nonrenumerated reserve requirement to be deposited at the Central Bank on liabilities in 
foreign currency for direct borrowing by firms.  The reserve requirement is to be maintained for the duration 
of the loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of five years or less, except for trade credit with a maturity 
of four months or less.  The percentage of the requirement declines as the maturity lengthens; from 
140 percent for funds that are 30 days or less to 42.8 percent for five year funds.                                                   
Colombia (2002) 
December, 2004: Foreigners investing in domestic markets must now keep their money in the country for at 
least one year. 
 
Czech Republic (1992) 
April, 1995:  The central bank introduced a fee of 0.25 percent on its foreign exchange transactions with 
banks, with the aim of discouraging short-term speculative flows. 
August 1, 1995: A limit on net short-term (less than one year) foreign borrowing by banks is introduced. 
Each bank is to ensure that its net short-term liabilities to nonresidents, in all currencies, do not exceed the 
smaller of 30 percent of claims on nonresidents or Kc 500 million. 
Administrative approval procedures seek to slow down short-term borrowing by nonbanks.  
 
Mexico (1990) 
April, 1992: A regulation that limited foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks to 10 percent of their 
total loan portfolio was passed.  Banks had to place 15 percent of these liabilities in highly liquid instruments.    
 Sources:  Banco Central de Chile, (1991 and 1992), Banco de la Republica, Colombia (1993 and 1994), 
Banco de Mexico (1992), and Conselho Monetario Nacional, Brasil (1994 and 1995). 
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Table 2.  Restrictions on Outflows: Asia, Europe, and Latin America 
 
Country and date (in parentheses) denoting the first year of the surge in outflows (or crisis) 
 
Argentina (crisis ending the Convertibility Plan, 2001) 
December, 2001: The Corralito is established, limiting bank withdrawal limits and restrictions on dollar 
transfers and loans. However, purchases through checks or credit cards available, and purchases of 
government bonds. Dec.30:  suspension of external payments (debt default). January 2002 there is a  40% 
devaluation and a dual exchange rate regime is introduced (1.4 pesos per dollar for trade operations, while 
floating regime for all other transactions. Later in the month, there is an. easing of bank withdrawals 
restrictions followed by an asymmetric pesofication. Pesofication of dollar deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar; 
dollar debts pesofied at market exchange rate; unification of exchange rate regimes in a floating scheme; right 
to withdraw wages and pension incomes in full; Corralon is imposed: freeze of bank term deposits. In 
September of that year it is required that stocks should be traded in domestic currency regulation. Since the 
latter is widely resisted, it was eased, but the new restriction significantly increased transactions costs.  In 
December 2002 the Corralito is rescinded. 
 
Brazil, (crisis ending the Real Plan, 1999) 
March 1999: Government ordered local investment funds to increase their holdings of government bonds. 
The central bank raised to 80 percent from 60 percent the minimum amount of sovereign debt that must be 
held in the country foreign investment fund. This lowered the share that could be held in other countries’ debt. 
Malaysia (Asian crisis, 1997) 
September, 1998:: Bank and foreign exchange controls limiting offshore swap operations, ban on short-
selling. 1998: repatriation of ringgit held offshore, and strict regulation on offshore operations and most 
international operations in ringgit, export and import operations allowed in foreign currency only, 12-month 
waiting period for non-residents to sell profits from Malaysian securities, approval required to invest abroad    
(above certain limits). In December residents are allowed to grant loans to nonresidents to purchase 
immovable property. In January, 1999 some derivative transactions for nonresidents are permitted. In 
February there is a gradual ease on the 12-month waiting period and some repatriations funds exempted from 
exit regulations. In March exports and imports trade ceilings are raised for operations with Thailand. In 
September commercial banks allowed to enter into some short-term currency swaps with nonresident 
stockbrokers. In March, 2000 funds from sale of securities purchased by nonresidents can be repatriated 
without paying exit levy and in June administrative procedures to ease classification of securities as being free 
from exit levy. September 30th: Some offshore banks are allowed to invest in ringgit assets. December 1st: 
foreign-owned banks are allowed to increase domestic credit. In February 2001 the exit levy is abolished for 
some operations. In May of that year the remaining exit levy is abolished. While in June all controls on 
nonresidents’ futures and options are abolished. In July, resident financial institutions allowed to extend 
ringgit loans to nonresidents investing in immovable property in Malaysia. In November 2002, resident banks 
credit levels to finance nonresidents projects in Malaysia are raised. On December 3rd: foreign currency limit 
for investment abroad by residents is abolished, and payments are liberalized to allow them to be in either 
ringgit or foreign currency. 
Spain (ERM Crisis, 1992) 
September, 1992: Bank of Spain suspends regular money market operations and introduces foreign exchange 
controls.  In October of that year the peseta is devalued and some of the controls a re lifted—in November the 
remaining foreign exchange controls rescinded. 
Thailand (Asian crisis, 1997) 
May, 1997: Bank of Thailand (BOT) introduces restrictions on capital account transactions.  In June BOT 
introduces additional measures to limit capital flows. Baht proceeds from sales of stocks required to be 
converted at the onshore exchange rate. Additional controls are introduced and later in the month a two-tier 
exchange rate is introduced. In September of that year, Additional controls on invisible and current account 
transactions are introduced.  In January 1998 it is required that proceeds on exports and invisible transactions 
and current account transfers must be surrendered after 7 days (instead of 15 days). BOT ends two-tier 
exchange rate regime.at the end of that month  
Sources: Banco de España, Bank Negara, Annual Report, various issues, and Bank of Thailand reports, 
various issues, Conselho Monetario Nacional, Brasil, (Dominguez and Tesar (2004).  
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE:  FINDING A COMMON GROUND 
This section aims to overcome (or at least take a step in that direction) two of the 
apples-to-oranges problems we have identified in the capital controls literature.  Namely, 
we attempt to:  (i) ascertain when and in what capacity capital controls were “successful” in 
achieving the stated objectives of the authorities (this is not trivial, as what constitutes as a 
success is defined very differently across studies) and; (ii) standardize (to some extent) the 
very eclectic array of descriptive and empirical methodologies and approaches that have 
characterized the empirical literature on capital controls.  Lastly, we bring to bear evidence 
on lesser well known episodes other than the “classics” (Chile’s controls on inflows starting 
in 1990 and Malaysia’s 1998 controls on outflows). 
In what follows, we review more than 30 papers that study capital controls either on 
inflows or outflows around the world.  Some are country case studies and some describe 
several individual country experiences, while others are multi-country studies that bunch 
several cases together. As noted earlier, the papers measure “success” differently--thus, our 
aim is to standardize methodology and results where possible so as to facilitate 
comparisons.  This will not only enable us to assess the effectiveness of alternative capital 
controls events, but it will also permit us to evaluate some of the policy implications of 
imposing controls on capital inflows and/or outflows under alternative scenarios. 
1. Types of studies 
We proceed as follows.  First, we cluster the papers into three broad groups: (i) 
capital inflows (CI), (ii) capital outflows (CO); and (iii) multi-country (MC)—the latter 
including the analysis of both capital inflows and/or capital outflow episodes.  We collected 
studies of capital controls for the following countries (the number of papers are shown in 
 12
parenthesis):  For CI, there are studies on: Brazil (6), Chile (11), Colombia (3), Czech 
Republic (1), Malaysia (2), and Thailand (1). For CO, we obtained information for 
Malaysia (5), Spain (3), and Thailand (2). For the MC group, we collected five papers, 
covering a wide array of countries.4  
 
2. Objective(s) of capital controls 
Given the multiple objectives that capital controls are expected to achieve, in each 
paper we asked the following questions:  Were capital controls able to 
(i) Reduce the volume of capital flows? 
(ii) Alter the composition of capital flows (towards longer maturity flows)? 
(iii) Reduce real exchange rate pressures? 
(iv) Allow for a more independent monetary policy? 
We asked these questions to each of the papers. As a first step to sort this 
information, we constructed Tables 3, 4, and 5. Table 3 includes CI episodes, Table 4 
displays CO episodes, and Table 5 focuses in MC studies. As can be seen on the tables, 
possible answers are YES, NO, or a blank space. If the table reads YES in any cell, it 
means that the paper finds that the corresponding objective of capital controls was 
achieved. NO stands for the paper finding that there was not such effect as a result of the 
capital controls. A blank space means that the paper does not address whether there was an 
effect or not. Sometimes the answer is followed by (ST). This is there to inform that the 
effects were only temporary, i.e. that an objective was achieved only in the Short Term. 
Just to give an example, in Table 3, the paper by Laurens and Cardoso (1998) studying the 
                                                          
4  For example, one of the more comprehensive multi-country papers uses monthly data for the 
period 1971-1998  for a panel of 26 countries. 
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case of the Chilean experience during the 1990’s, finds evidence that capital controls were 
able to reduce the volume of capital flows only in the short term, that they were able to alter 
the composition of these flows towards longer maturity flows, and they were not successful 
in reducing pressures on the real exchange rate. They do not report results regarding the 
effectiveness of capital controls in making monetary policy more independent. 
In a first pass to this information, by inspection, we can summarize the following 
(see Table 6). We observe that in general, it looks like capital controls, as it emerges from 
the results obtained in these papers, were successful in altering the composition of capital 
flows towards longer maturities, and in making monetary policy more independent. 
However, it looks that the papers are not very informative regarding the effectiveness of 
capital controls in reducing the volume of capital flows and reducing real exchange rate 
pressures. 
 
3. Indices of capital control effectiveness 
But this is not informative enough, since it still lacks some rigor to evaluate the 
effectiveness of capital controls episodes. In order to better understand this, we construct 
two indices of capital controls effectiveness. We call them Capital Controls Effectiveness 
Index (CCE Index), and Weighted Capital Controls Effectiveness Index (WCCE Index). 
The only difference in computing them, is that the WCCE Index weighs the results 
obtained in each paper by the degree of methodological rigor applied to draw conclusions –
more on this below. 
In both cases, following the information summarized in Tables 3-5, we arbitrarily 
assigned the following values:  
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If the answer is YES, the corresponding value is 1, 
If the answer is NO, the value assigned is -1. 
If the question is not addressed at all, it corresponds a value of 0. 
These values are designed to equally weigh the existence or not existence of effects 
as a result of the imposition of capital controls, and to give no weight to questions not 
addressed, so as not to distort the results in case any objective of capital controls is not 
answered by the paper. 
With these values at hand, for each country, we computed simple averages of these 
numbers for each of the four questions asked to the papers. This gives, for example, a CCE 
Index for volume reduction for each country, a CCE Index for real exchange rate pressures 
reduction for each country, and so on and so forth. With this information we are able to 
compare, for each objective, which country was more effective.  
We also used this information to compute some sort of aggregate index of capital 
controls effectiveness, by averaging out the four CCE Indices for each country, and then 
compare a global CCE Index among countries. 
However, as already mentioned, the methodology used to evaluate success is highly 
heterogeneous. The latter is the consequence of how different papers evaluate capital 
controls. Some papers are mainly descriptive, generating conclusions just by the 
movements (or lack of thereof) in the time series of the main variables, lacking any 
rigorous statistical or econometric analysis. Other papers do some statistical or econometric 
methodology to evaluate capital controls events. Among them, the variance is still high 
regarding the degree of rigor used to extract conclusions from the data. 
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In order to control for these differences, we did another pass to the information in 
the papers. We classify each study according to the degree of methodological rigor in, 
LOW, INTERMEDIATE, and HIGH.  
For this purpose, we consider a study to be LOW, INTERMEDIATE, and HIGH, according 
to the following criteria: 
Low: This includes studies that are mainly descriptive analysis of events and/or time series. 
Intermediate: This groups papers that draw conclusions from a more formal evaluation of 
events, still lacking any formal hypothesis testing. An example of this could be papers that 
perform some time re-scaling to compare the effects of capital controls “before” and “after” 
capital controls. 
High: This includes only those studies that have highly developed econometric techniques, 
with a well defined hypothesis testing. 
Table 7 (in the Appendix) summarizes the methodology used in each paper, as well 
as the corresponding classification in Low, Intermediate, High, following the above 
definitions. 
In order to compute the WCCE Index, we assigned the following values: 
Low: 0.1 
Intermediate: 0.5 
High: 1. 
With these values at hand, we compute the WCCE Index similarly to the CCE 
Index, in order to compare, for each of the four objectives, which country has been more 
effective in achieving them. We also compute an aggregate (per country) WCCE Index 
This enables us to understand for which countries were capital controls more useful. 
Furthermore, given these, we can, at least as a first approximation, find conditions under 
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which capital controls tend to be effective. Once more, it is worth mentioning that these 
exercises were done separately for the 3 clusters in which we separated the papers, namely 
CI, CO, and MC. 
 
4. Summary of results 
Summary results of CCE Index and WCCE Index are presented in Table 8 (Panels 
A, B and C). From these indices, we can extract the following policy conclusions. Looking 
at controls on inflows (Panel A) along with the preliminary results in Table 6, capital 
controls were able to make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition of 
capital flows towards longer maturities, and reduce real exchange rate pressures (although 
the evidence on the latter is more controversial). Interestingly, the usual model economy for 
these type of controls, Chile, stands out as achieving these goals quite comfortably, as the 
WCCE Index shows. In this regard, initial conditions or characteristics such as the ones in 
Chile in the early 1990’s, along with the continuing reforms during the 1990’s look like 
necessary conditions for capital controls on inflows to be effective. On the other hand, 
capital controls on inflows were not very effective in reducing the volume of net flows 
(hence its impact on the current account balance). 
Looking in more detail, we see that Malaysia (1994) stands out as the best 
performance in terms of reducing the volume of capital flows, Chile dominates regarding 
the change in capital flows maturity, Thailand does it in respect to reducing real exchange 
rate pressures, and Chile also dominates in regards to monetary policy independence. 
Overall, as the average of the WCCE Index reflects, Chile emerges as the more successful 
example of capital controls on inflows. 
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When focusing on capital controls on outflows (Panel B), the received wisdom is 
that Malaysia (1997) is the example to follow. From our results, we can see that these types 
of capital controls were effective in reducing capital outflows, and in making monetary 
policy more independent. Yet, the results from WCCE Index are not as conclusive as the 
Chilean controls on inflows.  
If we focus on the reduction in capital flows, Thailand and Spain dominate 
Malaysia. Regarding the switch in capital flows towards more longer maturity no 
conclusion can be extracted, whereas Spain emerges as the best in regard to real exchange 
rate pressures reduction; on the other hand, Malaysia clearly dominates when dealing with 
making monetary policy more independent. On the aggregate, Malaysia appears as the 
more successful experience in terms of capital controls on outflows.  
Some further comments are in order. First, it could be argued that these indices are 
not taking into account many other variables that might be affecting the effectiveness of 
capital controls, especially the set of “other” reforms being put in place in each country 
during each capital controls episode. That is true. However, this paper is reviewing and 
assessing only the conclusion contained in previous papers, not the papers themselves. All 
the reviewed papers draw conclusions from their information sets, and we just put them 
together and try to extract the main message that these papers give as a group. Furthermore, 
precisely because of these “omitted variables bias” type of problem is that our WCCE 
Index becomes more relevant. For example, any structural reform carried on in parallel 
with capital controls is not usually specifically reflected in the papers we review—in a 
sense, for us this is similar to running a regression with missing data that you have to 
control for. This is where the degree of methodological rigor becomes important. The more 
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formal the analysis is, especially if including hypothesis testing, the more accurate the 
information contained in it. 
Second, a similar reasoning applies to the endogeneity of capital controls. Some 
could argue that we should control for it. Again, we rely on the conclusions obtained in 
previous papers, thus giving more value to the results we obtain from WCCE Index. Also, 
this is relevant for how controls on capital inflows affect capital outflows. Moreover, that is 
why we cluster CI and CO separately in our analysis above. 
Third, it is worth mentioning that the papers we review are clearly not the only ones 
dealing with capital controls. There are many papers that analyze the long-run effects of 
capital controls, whereas we focus on the short-run only, as can be seen from the questions 
we ask to the papers. For completeness, Table 9 lists some of the papers that study the 
effects of capital controls on growth –we don’t go into further details since these papers are 
out of our scope. 
Fourth, another interesting point is whether capital controls regimes are transitory or 
permanent. Here, as the type of questions we focus on clearly reveals, we are interested 
only in transitory events. This is why episodes such as the Chinese or Indian approach to 
capital controls are not covered here –see the papers on these countries contained in this 
volume for that purpose. 
Fifth, one interesting point to raise is related to the timing (and related endogeneity) 
of capital controls:  whether they are imposed in response to events – crises— or if they are 
design in advance. Here, once more, we lack information because we rely only on what 
papers conclude. It is worth mentioning though, that by inspection, it might appear like the 
Malaysia (1997) episode could have been designed in advance, unlike most of the other 
episodes, and especially unlike common wisdom about itself. This can be read from the 
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chronologies described in Tables 1 and 2. In the case of Malaysia (1997), a big chunk of 
controls were imposed on September 1st, 1997. Furthermore, the level of detail in them 
seems suggests that this was not decided and designed just in response to the crises. 
Sixth, some times, temporary capital controls events become permanent. This could 
be because of time consistency problems, or just because of the current response to future 
changes: rational expectations calls for incorporating in your current decision the fact that 
in a pre-specified time period capital controls will be levied. Furthermore, even if a country 
imposed capital controls, and did levy them at the pre-established date, this might work as a 
signal that capital controls might be imposed in the future if needed. However, this says 
nothing about this being either good or bad –many things will influence the latter, 
especially its effectiveness, as well as its effects on property rights. Anyway, imposing 
capital controls once, establishes some kind of precedent regarding a country’s position 
towards capital mobility, despite its costs and benefits. This is another dimension in which 
temporary capital controls might become “permanent”.  
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Table 3. The Famous Chilean Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
 
Did controls on inflows 
 
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
 
Reduce the 
volume of 
net capital 
inflows 
 
Alter the 
composition of  
flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate  
pressures 
 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
 
Brazil 
Cardoso & Goldfajn 
(1998) 
 Yes (ST) Yes (ST)   
Edison & Reinhart 1994   No No 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)  Yes (ST) Yes (ST)   
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1993-1997 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes (ST) 
 
Chile 
De Gregorio, Edwards  
&Valdés (2000) 
1988:I-
1998:II 
Yes Yes (ST) Yes (ST) Yes (ST) 
Edwards (1999)a   Yes No Yes (ST) 
Edwards (1999)b 1991:6-
1998:9 
No Yes No Yes 
Edwards & Rigobon 
(2004) 
1991:1-
1999:9 
  Yes  
Hernández  & Schmidt-
Hebbel (1999) 
 Yes (ST) Yes (ST) No Yes 
Labán, Larraín & 
Chumacero (1997) 
1985-1994 No Yes   
Labán & Larraín 
(1998) 
     
Laurens & Cardoso 
(1998) 
 
 
Yes (ST) Yes No  
Le Fort & Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-1994 No  
Yes 
Yes Yes 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)  Yes (ST) Yes (ST)   
Valdés-Prieto &  Soto 
(1995) 
1987-1995  
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
1991-1998  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
      
      
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
1 Note that there are several studies on Malaysia’s 1998 capital controls targeting outflows.  Here, we are 
referring to the controls on capital inflows introduced in January 1994. 
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Table 3 (continued). The Famous Chilean Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
 
Did controls on inflows 
 
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
 
Reduce the 
volume of 
net capital 
inflows 
 
Alter the 
composition of  
flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate  
pressures 
 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
 
Colombia 
Le Fort & Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-1995 Yes (ST) Yes Yes Yes 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)  No No   
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1993-1998 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Czech Republic 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)  No Yes (ST)   
 
Malaysia (1989) 1 
Reinhart & Smith (1998)   Yes Yes   
 
Malaysia (1994) 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1994 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes (ST) 
 
Yes 
 
Thailand 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
 
1995-1997 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
1 Note that there are several studies on Malaysia’s 1998 capital controls targeting outflows.  Here, we are 
referring to the controls on capital inflows introduced in January 1994. 
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Table 4. The Famous Malaysian Case and Other Lesser Deities: 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
Did controls on outflows: 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Episode 
Reduce the 
volume of net 
capital 
outflows 
Alter the 
composition of  
flows 
Reduce real 
exchange rate  
pressures 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
 
 
Malaysia 
Tamirisia (2004) 1991:1-
2002:12 
  No Yes 
Dornbusch (2001)    No  
Edison & Reinhart (2000)    Yes Yes 
Kaplan & Rodrik (2002) 1992-1996    Yes 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1998-2000 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Spain 
Jose Vinals(1992) 1992 No     
Edison & Reinhart 1995-1999   No No 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1992 
 
Yes 
  
Yes (ST) 
 
Yes 
 
Thailand 
Edison & Reinhart (2000)    No No 
Ariyoshi, Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-Robe, 
Canales-Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1997-1998 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes (ST) 
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
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Table 5. The “Others” – Multicountry Studies 
Summary of Key Findings on “Effectiveness” 
 
Did controls on inflows: 
 
Study 
 
 
 
Sample 
 
Reduce the 
volume of net 
capital inflows 
 
Alter the 
composition 
of  flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate 
pressures 
 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
      
Montiel & 
Reinhart 
(1999) 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Kenya 
and Uganda (1990-1996) 
No Yes (ST)  No 
      
Reinhart 
& Smith 
(1998) 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Malaysia, 
Mexico, 
 Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Philippines 
Yes (ST) Yes (ST)   
      
Kaplan & 
Rodrik 
(2002) 
Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia 
(monthly and quarterly 
data for 1992-1996 -before 
crisis- and from crisis time 
and 1 year ahead) 
   Yes 
      
Edison & 
Reinhart 
(1999) 
Spain (1991-1993), and 
1995-1999 for Brazil, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Control group: Philippines 
and South Korea (daily 
data) 
  No No 
      
Miniane & 
Rogers 
(2004) 
Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
The Netherlands, Norway, 
The Philippines, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK. 
(monthly data for 1971:1-
1998:12) 
  Yes (ST) No 
 
Notes:  A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular 
relationship. An (ST) refers to cases where only short-term effects were detected. 
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Table 6. Summary of Results By Country and Multi-country Studies 
 
 
Did controls on inflows: 
 
 
Study 
 
Reduce the 
volume of 
net capital 
inflows 
 
Alter the 
composition 
of  flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate  
pressures 
Make 
monetary 
policy more 
independent 
 
Complete Sample Unclear Yes Unclear Yes 
     
Control on Inflows     
Brazil Unclear Unclear No Unclear 
Chile Unclear Yes Unclear** Yes 
Colombia Unclear Unclear Unclear Yes 
Czech Republic No Yes   
Malaysia (1989) Yes Yes   
Malaysia (1994) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Control on Outflows     
Malaysia (1998)   Unclear Yes 
Spain Unclear  Unclear Unclear 
Thailand Yes  Yes Yes 
     
Multi-country studies Yes Yes Yes No 
     
     
 
Note: Yes stands for yes, it worked; No for no, it did not work; Unclear for mixed results; and blanks for 
results not reported. 
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Table 7. Capital Inflows: The Indices 
 
Country 
 
Index 
 
Reduce 
the 
volume of 
net 
capital  
inflows 
Alter the 
composition of 
flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate 
pressures 
 
Make 
Monetary 
Policy 
 Independent 
. 
Country 
Average 
 
       
CCE 0.00 0.00 -0.67 0.00 0 Brazil 
WCCE 0.35 0.35 -0.275 -0.225 0.05 
       
CCE -0.09 0.64 -0.27 0.45 0.18 Chile 
WCCE 0.03 0.67 -0.27 0.29 0.18 
       
CCE -0.33 -0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 Colombia 
WCCE -0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.07 -0.07 
       
CCE -1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Czech 
Republic WCCE -0.50 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 
       
CCE 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 Malaysia 
WCCE 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.18 
       
CCE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Thailand 
 WCCE 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
       
 
Sources:  Appendix Table 1 and sources cited therein. 
 
Table 8.Capital Outflows:  The Indices 
 
Country 
 
Index 
 
Reduce 
the 
volume of 
net 
capital  
inflows 
Alter the 
composition of 
flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate 
pressures 
 
Make 
Monetary 
Policy 
Independent 
 
Country 
Average 
 
       
CCE 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.25 Malaysia 
WCCE 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.16 
       
CCE 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.38 Spain 
WCCE 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.11 
       
CCE 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 Thailand 
WCCE 0.05 0.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.24 
       
 
Sources:  Appendix Table 2 and sources cited therein. 
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Table 9. Multi-Country Studies:  The Indices 
 
Index 
 
Reduce the 
volume of net 
capital  
inflows 
Alter the 
composition of 
flows 
 
Reduce real 
exchange rate 
pressures 
 
Make monetary 
policy more 
independent 
 
     
CCE 0.00 0.40 0.00 -0.40 
WCCE -0.10 0.30 0.00 -0.40 
  
  
Sources:  Appendix Table 3 and sources cited therein. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
               In sum, capital controls on inflows seem to: make monetary policy more 
independent; alter the composition of capital flows; reduce real exchange rate pressures 
(although the evidence is more controversial). 5  Capital controls on inflows, however, 
seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and hence, the current account balance) 
As to controls on capital outflows, there is Malaysia…and there is everybody else.  
In Malaysia, controls reduce outflows, and may give room for more independent 
monetary policy. 6  There is little evidence of “success” in other countries attempting to 
control outflows, either in terms of altering the volume or regaining monetary policy 
independence.  These findings are in line with those of an earlier literature focused on 
capital flight (as in Mathieson and Rojas Suarez, 1996) and dual or parallel exchange 
markets (an in Kuigel and Lizondo, 1997). 
While their effectiveness varies across time, countries, and types of measures used, 
limiting private external borrowing in the “good times” plays an important prudential role 
                                                          
5  According to the WCCI, Chile stands out in achieving these goals. 
6  Yet, the results for Malaysia based on the WCCI are not as conclusive as for the Chilean 
controls on inflows. 
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because more often than not countries that are “debt intolerant”. Indeed, often the critical 
problem in good times is that countries borrow too much! 7 
            While our study has made the case for the need to distinguish between measures 
primarily designed to discourage inflows versus curbing outflows, it would be worthwhile 
for future research to attempt to ascertain whether there are also important differences in 
achieving “success” between measures that are more market friendly (as in the Chilean 
reserve requirements) versus those that are based on more blunt quantitative restrictions.  
Furthermore, in this study, owing to the nature of most of the empirical work reviewed 
here, (which treats the control measures as single episodes) it would be interesting for 
policy purposes to examine differences between short run and long run impacts of the 
measures, so as to ascertain how quickly do control measures lose their effectiveness. 
 As long as capital flows to emerging markets remain volatile and potentially 
disruptive, the discussion of capital controls in academic and policy circles will remain 
alive and hence there is a real need, to evaluate their effectiveness, however defined.  As 
noted earlier it is an old discussion. Tobin’s seminal paper dates back to the early 1970s.  
Furthermore capital controls have been used historically to deal with the fickle capital flow 
cycle dating back at least two hundred years.  Indeed, not unlike in past inflow episodes, at 
the time of this writing countries like Colombia or Argentina have either implemented 
controls of capital inflows or are contemplating doing so. 
. 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) for details. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Capital Inflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric 
Rigor 
 
Brazil 
Cardoso & Goldfajn 
(1998) 
1988:1-
1995:12 
OLS controlling for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, IV, and VAR They control for endogeneity 
of capital controls (government’s reaction function) 
High 
Edison & Reinhart 
(1999) 
1995-
2001 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects of 
controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
1994-
1996 
Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of the 
various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1993-
1997 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, dividing 
facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital outflows 
(financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and their 
liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
Chile 
De Gregorio, 
Edwards  &Valdés 
(2000) 
1988:I-
1998:II 
IV and VAR. With these, hey address simultaneity problems, exogenous upward trend in capital flow, 
bias due to measurement error because of loopholes in controls. They consider two alternative measures 
of expected devaluations: (i)effective rate of depreciation; and  (ii) one step ahead forecast from a rolling 
ARMA. They consider two alternative measures of flows: (i) short tem flows to GDP; and (ii) total flows 
to GDP. 
High 
Edwards (1999)a 1994:10-
1999:1 
GARCH for changes in the short term central bank nominal interest rate, and changes in the log of the 
stock market index, using daily data. Descriptive analysis of the effects of capital controls on the 
composition of capital inflows, and domestic interest rates and monetary policy independence. 
High 
Edwards (1999)b 1991:6-
1998:9 
Descriptive analysis of the composition of capital flows during capital controls times. VAR on the effects 
of capital controls on the real exchange rate. GARCH for changes in the short term central bank nominal 
interest rate, and changes in the log of the stock market index. 
High 
Edwards & Rigobon 
(2004) 
1991:1-
1999:9 
Using stochastic calculus, they compute the shadow exchange rate and its bands. GARCH (effect of 
capital controls on propagation of external shocks. Estimate a mean and a variance equation. 
High 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 
Capital Inflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric 
Rigor 
 
Chile (continued) 
Hernández  & 
Schmidt-Hebbel 
(1999) 
1989-
1998:II 
and 
1998:7-
1999:6 
Least squares estimation, controlling for spurious correlation, endogeniety of the RHS regressors, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Co-integration analysis and error-correction model. TSLS 
estimation also included 
High 
Labán, Larraín & 
Chumacero (1997) 
1985-
1994 
Estimation of a special case of non-linear models in which a particular variable may adopt a certain law of 
motion conditional on an observation passed a threshold (special case of Markov Switching Regime 
Models, with the threshold replacing the transition matrix). They run a full sample parsimonious 
regression for each series, to determine variables to include in the threshold process; for given choice of 
threshold variable, they estimated the model and got the p-value associated with a null of a unique stable 
representation; if the latter is rejected in favor of threshold process chose the threshold variable that 
minimizes the sum of squares of residuals; and reduce the threshold model to a parsimonious 
representation. 
High 
Labán & Larraín 
(1998) 
1985-
1996 
Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic effects. 
Low 
Laurens & Cardoso 
(1998) 
1985:I-
1994:IV 
 
Linear and Cubic approximations of net inflows as primarily of interest rate differentials. High 
Le Fort & 
Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-
1994 
Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic. 
Low 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
1990-
1994 
Event comparison through time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of the 
various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 
Capital Inflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric 
Rigor 
Chile (concluded) 
    
Valdés-Prieto &  
Soto 
(1995) 
1987-
1995  
Error-correction representation (that is efficient) with a two-step procedure: (i) OLS estimation of the real 
exchange rate on a set of explanatory variables to contrast the estimated residuals; and (ii) use these 
residuals to estimate by OLS an error correction equation measuring the deviation of the dependent 
variable from its long term equilibrium level (given by (i)). They checked for several endogeneity and 
simultaneity biases. They also looked at the effect of controls on short term credit 
High 
 
Colombia 
Le Fort & 
Budnevich 
(1997) 
1990-
1995 
Descriptive analysis of events, describing the context for implementing capital controls and the main 
macroeconomic. 
Low 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
 Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 
the various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1993-
1998 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
 
Czech Republic 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
1994-
1997 
Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 
the various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
 
Malaysia (1989) 
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998)  
1993-
1996 
Event comparison through  time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description of 
the various measures applied in each economy 
Medium 
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Appendix Table 1 (concluded) 
Capital Inflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric 
Rigor  
 
 
Malaysia (1994) 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1994 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
 
Thailand 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1995-1997 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls 
and their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
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Appendix Table 2 
Capital Outflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
  
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric Rigor 
 
Malaysia 
Tamirisia (2004) 1991:1-
2002:12 
Error-correction model. Series on net foreign portfolio assets are by foreign portfolio assets to isolate 
country-specific effects 
High 
Dornbusch (2001)  Descriptive analysis of different variables Low 
Edison & Reinhart 
(2000) 
 Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 
Kaplan & Rodrik 
(2002) 
1992-
1996  
Shifted difference in differences to separate the counterfactual of capital controls versus IMF-based-
program recovery. This methodology enables the authors to re-schedule the episodes in terms of the 
timing of the crises (shifted). The difference in differences allows them to capture the comparison 
effect of the recovery with capital controls vis a vis with a successful IMF program, controlling for 
exogenous and country-specific effects (static and dynamics) 
High 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1998-
2000 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
    
 
Spain 
Jose Viñals(1992) 1992 Descriptive analysis of economic policy measures and its effect on various macroeconomic variables Low 
Edison & Reinhart 
(1999) 
1991-
1993 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued) 
Capital Outflows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
  
 
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric Rigor 
    
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1992 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
 
Thailand 
Edison & Reinhart 
(2000) 
1995-
1999 
Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects 
of controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window 
High 
Ariyoshi, 
Habermeier, 
Laurens, Okter-
Robe, Canales-
Kriljenko & 
Kirilenko (2000) 
 
1997-
1998 
Extensive descriptive and comparative country-studies analysis of time-series in each episode, 
dividing facts according to controls on capital inflows (limiting short-term flows), control on capital 
outflows (financial crises), extensive exchange controls (financial crises), long standing controls and 
their liberalization, rapid liberalization 
Low 
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Appendix Table 3 
Multi-country Studies: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
  
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric Rigor 
Montiel & Reinhart 
(1999) 
 1990-1996 They construct indices to measure incidence and intensity of capital account restrictions. Estimation 
of fix-effect panel regressions to explain volume and composition of capital flows. Results are 
checked for robustness by IV estimations. Covers Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Czech Republic, Egypt, Kenya 
and Uganda 
High 
    
Reinhart & Smith 
(1998) 
1990-1997 Event comparison through time- rescaling (labeling the implementation of controls as period “t”, and 
analyzing the evolution of the series in “t-1”, and through “t+2”. Detailed chronological description 
of the various measures applied in each economy. Covers Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines. 
Intermediate 
    
Kaplan & Rodrik 
(2002) 
1992-1996  Shifted difference in differences to separate the counterfactual of capital controls versus IMF-based-
program recovery. This methodology enables the authors to re-schedule the episodes in terms of the 
timing of the crises (shifted). The difference in differences allows them to capture the comparison 
effect of the recovery with capital controls vis a vis with a successful IMF program, controlling for 
exogenous and country-specific effects (static and dynamics). Covers Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia (monthly and quarterly data for 1992-1996 -before crisis- and from crisis time and 1 year 
ahead) 
 
    
Edison & Reinhart 
(1999) 
1991-1999 Test for equality of moments and changes in persistence between capital controls and no controls, 
principal components analysis; block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; GARCH for the effects of 
controls on volatility; and Wald tests for structural brakes over a rolling window. Covers Spain 
(1991-1993), and 1995-1999 for Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand. Control group: Philippines and 
South Korea 
High 
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Appendix Table 3 (concluded) 
Multi-country Studies: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor 
  
 
Study 
 
 
Sample 
 
Methodology 
 
Econometric Rigor 
Miniane & Rogers 
(2004) 
1971:1-
1998:12 
 
Panel VAR and individual country VAR of commodity prices, US industrial production , US 
consumers prices, foreign industrial production, foreign interest rates, US Fed Funds Rate, non-
borrowed reserves to reserves ratio and nominal exchange rate in response to a 25 basis points 
increase in the Fed Funds Rate. For the country level VAR they regress each country separately, 
compute the cumulative exchange rate and interest rate responses, and finally regress country–
specific responses on the values of capital control index, exchange rate regime, degree of 
dollarization, and trade integration. Covers Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Norway, The Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK 
High 

